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Abstract
Quantification theories assume that numbers govern and steer a policy field or an organisation. In order to steer success-
fully, however, the local interpretation of numbers takes centre stage as the meaning of numbers—and thus the way how
actors respond to them—varies between systems or sectors. Empirically, this article reviews how a German university
makes sense of political numbers and their implicit steering signals, and how quantification alters its organisational struc-
tures and reshapes the roles of academics. The article analyses the translation process distinguishing between three levels:
the political discourse on university reform; the organisational adaptations; and the effects they have on the professional
academic role. The article finds that the university has highly differentiated strategies to respond to the ‘governance by
numbers,’ and that it has established independent number-based steering systems. We also find that such differentiation
of programmes makes the university management more flexible, helping it deal with anticipated goal conflicts and un-
wanted allocative effects, but it also places serious strain on—and potentially overburns—the coordination provided by
the university’s central administration. We also find that academics have started to align their behavioural strategies to-
wards fulfilling their organisational goals and that they tend to deviate from professional expectations. Discussing these
differentiated strategies, this article shows how the differentiation of governance approaches also contributes to the uni-
versity becoming an ‘organisational actor.’ These preliminary findings suggest the need for and potential direction of fur-
ther investigations.
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1. Introduction
For the past 40 years, higher education studies have be-
come acutely aware of and have criticized, the various
changes and reforms in the sector. In this context, the
new public management (NPM) provided the main an-
alytical lens through which reform was perceived and
practical tools to overcome the diagnosed inefficiencies,
opacity, and professional idiosyncrasies of the higher ed-
ucation sector were chosen (for NPM see Hood, 1991).
Over the years, conceptual and practical innovations
have been added, suggesting that reforms do not form
part of a grand plan, but recurrently intervene to re-
pair the shortcomings and unintended effects of pre-
vious interventions (on this general feature of reform
see Luhmann, 1992, p. 74). Wittrock summarises this
layering nicely: “Universities exist with layer upon layer
of quite divergent legacies, yet somehow they have also
succeeded in preserving a strong element of continu-
ity amidst all the change” (Wittrock, 1993, p. 305). The
most current layer of university reform is ‘quantification,’
whichmeans that numbers are behind identification and
adoption of promising strategies, permit the ‘objective’
observation of the effects of reforms, and ensure ac-
countability. This ‘governance by numbers’ (e.g., Miller,
2001; Rose, 1991) is expected to rationalise and mod-
ernise the university, and—for example through mech-
anisms of rankings (see Ringel, Brankovic, & Werron,
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2020)—the entire higher education sector. However, the
main assumption of this article that this rationalisation
process does not come without costs; it not only restruc-
tures the university but also reshapes the university’s re-
lation to its environment, i.e., politics and staff members.
In the theoretical narrative of this new layer, the ef-
fectiveness of numbers is taken for grantedwhile the doc-
umented experience with the numerical steering of or-
ganisations, and more specifically, universities, is at best
ambivalent. One widely communicated reason refers to
the resistance of the university to any change; in particu-
lar, the German university has a longstanding reputation
of being unable and unwilling to reform (e.g., Stichweh,
1994). Another, methodological reason, which the wider
public are often concerned with, relates to the accu-
rate measurement of professional performance. This ar-
ticle explores how governance by numbers actually oc-
curs, if or to what extent universities live up to the im-
plicit promise of quantification’s effectiveness, and,most
importantly, this article asks how numbers restructure
the organisation.
The argument is outlined in three sections. First, the
quantification literature is reviewed in order to show
how numbers can improve steering. As far as ‘gover-
nance by numbers’ is concerned, Miller and O’Leary’s
(1994a, 1994b) account of the reform at Caterpillar in
the 1980s is used as an analytical frame for the em-
pirical exploration of the numerical reform of universi-
ties. Examining the effects of numbers on organizational
reform, the authors suggested to not focus on the or-
ganisation alone, but to include the societal or politi-
cal discourse as well as to reflect on the alterations at
a personal level. Thus, Miller and O’Leary’s blueprint
allows us to describe university reform by discerning
three intertwined analytical levels: First, the political pro-
gramme promoting generic ideas about the need, and
main direction, of reform. Second, the organisational
level, where these programmes are enforced by changes
to the production process and the reallocation of respon-
sibilities. At a third, individual level, the workers are as-
signed new responsibilities and skills for the production
process. Numbers imply that workers need to develop
numeracy, i.e., the skill to understand and apply num-
bers. This layered model has been created for a single-
case study and used to develop a broader understand-
ing of reforming economic firms through numbers. This
article explores the process of quantifying the perfor-
mance of universities and compares how quantification
reshapes the ‘production processes’ of a German uni-
versity. This exploratory study leads to a set of tenta-
tive questions that should help to design further system-
atic research.
2. Quantification and Organisation
This section is divided into three subsections: First, we
briefly sketch a communicative perspective on quantifi-
cation; second, we outline the basic argument of the
Caterpillar study by Miller and O’Leary. Together these
considerations allow us to, third, delineate a framework
that structures the empirical investigation of Section 3.
2.1. Quantification and Organisational Change
Even at the turn of the last century,Weber (1978) already
considered accounting and control through numbers to
be a decisive step in the development towards the mod-
ern capitalist society. The broader social phenomena we
subsume under the notion of quantification, however,
have long been ignored by the social sciences (overview
in Miller, 2007). This neglect was turned into awareness
only over the last two decades when numbers were
identified as critical for modernity (prominently, Porter,
1996) and the establishment of state organisations (e.g.,
Heintz, 2012). Increasingly, numbers are identified as a
ubiquitous phenomenon (Mennicken & Espeland, 2019).
As a result of this growing interest, quantification stud-
ies provide a wide, internally highly differentiated and
specialised research area (overview in Heintz, 2018).
This converges in the broad definition that quantifica-
tion comprises “the production and communication of
numbers—and its consequences” (Espeland & Stevens,
2008, p. 402). Such a communicative approach to quan-
tification is anticipated by systems’ theory, as Luhmann
(1997) had already suggested before the excitement over
quantification, that numbers simplify communication as
they insulate the respective statement against criticism;
in other words, arguments sustained by numbers are
more difficult to negate than others (see also Heintz,
2016). This basic idea also serves as a starting point for
the debate on quantification by Espeland and Stevens
(2008). These authors, however, further develop the ba-
sic communicative model of quantification with the help
of the theory of speech-acts by John Austin (1975), and
discern different types of numbers and how numbers
may improve and rationalise governance. Assuming that
different things are done by different numbers (Espeland
& Stevens, 2008, p. 405), the main focus of Espeland
and Stevens is on the varied consequences of quan-
tification, i.e., how new categories of countable things
emerge, how numbers and their implicit accuracy can
be interpreted, and where and when new infrastruc-
tures of counting materialise. One aspect of Espeland
and Stevens’s diversity-of-numbers argument that’s of
particular interest to this article concerns the contextu-
alised meaning of numbers. For example, when univer-
sities use publication scores to document scholarly pro-
ductivity (see Krüger, 2020), these scores assume a dif-
ferent meaning when they are applied, e.g., by funders
to benchmark resource allocation. The effects of this dif-
ferentiation of meanings are also investigated by Power
(2007). He proposes a ‘sequential hypothesis’ about the
changing meaning of numbers: Numbers are first gener-
ated at the operational level to make performance tan-
gible and visible for management. These numbers ‘turn-
the-inside-out,’ providing evidence of the organisational
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performance from the perspective of operators. Once
these numbers are released into the public realm, they
can be used at will, for example, to promote external—
i.e., mainly political or economic—interests, and then
be redirected to the operational level. This ‘turning-the-
outside-in’ may challenge the local (often professional)
performance routines. These effects of quantification
on higher education have, for example, been studied in
Espeland and Sauder’s (2007) seminal article on reactiv-
ity. Their study suggests that the university management
responds to results of rankings by improving their per-
formance but also by gaming those numbers in order
to climb up the ranks. As far as the active steering of
organisations through numbers is concerned, the prac-
tice should, generally speaking, rationalise management
and unburden the bureaucratic authority as “members
are provided with information, which, when previously
programmed benchmarks are met, triggers decisions”
(Luhmann, 1964, p. 98, author’s translation). Empirical
studies on the effects of numbers on universities suggest
this automated steering is not without collateral effects
(e.g., Huber & Hillebrandt, 2019).
The basic argument is that numbers call for inter-
pretation (or translation) at the point of use, other-
wise their unfiltered application may be incomprehen-
sible to the addressees. Thus, the general promise of a
communication-based concept of quantification is to effi-
ciently implement reform strategies, albeit at the cost of
altering the organisation, its perception of external (and
internal) demands, as well as its decision-making proce-
dures. This article explores the specific forms and em-
pirical variations in performance indicator communica-
tion within a German university—MiddletownUniversity
(MU). This article uses Miller and O’Leary’s (1994a,
1994b) analysis of the reform of the Caterpillar plant in
Decatur, Illinois, as its analytical framework which is dis-
cussed in the next section.
2.2. The Caterpillar Story: An Analytical Framework
In the early 1980s, the Caterpillar company, which de-
signs, develops, and produces machinery and engines,
failed to compete successfully with its Japanese competi-
tor Komatsu. Miller and O’Leary (1994a, 1994b) analy-
sed Caterpillar’s recovery and showed that the process
ofmaking the company profitable again started at the po-
litical level. The political discourse perceived Caterpillar
and its problems as part of a broader challenge to
the American industrial sector, its competitiveness, and
more generally to American prosperity itself. The mod-
ernisation and reform of US industries in general, and
of Caterpillar in particular, called for plant re-design
and re-training of the workforce; its main objective was,
from a political perspective, the re-establishment of
American competitiveness. Although not all voices in the
political discourse agreed on every aspect of how the
American industry should recover, they all converged on
the ‘need to act.’
Against this political background, the Caterpillar com-
pany re-structured and modernised its plants. Miller
and O’Leary focus their studies on the plant in Decatur,
Illinois, where two dimensions of organizational adap-
tation caught their attention: First, the production pro-
cess was re-organised through a new assembly line that
simplified andmodularised the production process—the
authors also refer to “cellular working arrangements”
(Miller & O’Leary, 1994b, p. 480). The second dimension
concerns the establishment of a quantitative ‘audit trail’
for all aspects of the production process enabling contin-
uous comparison with the Japanese competitor through
numbers; this “competitor benchmarking” is a:
Calculative practice that the image of Japanese com-
petition was made real to those working in the North
American plants of Caterpillar Inc. By this means,
‘competitiveness’ was no longer an abstract idea, a
simple invocation to work harder, to do more, to
produce quicker. ‘Competitiveness’ meant ‘person-
to-person’ competition with a Japanese worker. The
“threat” from Japan to American manufacturing was
to be given a face, and a number. (Miller & O’Leary,
1994b, p. 472, author’s emphasis)
This practice enabled the comparison of all activities
within the plant, between plants, and their competitors.
This comprehensive comparability also changed the ex-
pectations of the skills of the workforce. Benchmarking
forced Caterpillar to re-educate its workforce as it—
together with the modularised production structure—
established “a new way of relating individuals to their
work within the factory” (Miller & O’Leary, 1994b,
p. 477). Workers had to develop numeracy, i.e., the con-
tinuous comparison with the competitor’s performance
required them to learn how to read numbers and then
to have the flexibly to adapt their work to diverse bench-
marks. At this individual level, quantification established
an ‘economic citizenship’ that not only empoweredwork-
ers but also placed new responsibility on their shoul-
ders, and thus altered their traditional membership role
(Miller & O’Leary, 1994b, p. 478). Miller and O’Leary
(1994b, p. 473) notice that the workforce obtains a new,
more influential role, as:
Authority would flow directly from the customer to
the work process, along the Assembly Highway, in ac-
cordance with the ideal of empowered workers re-
sponding immediately to the wants and wishes of the
customer. Authority would no longer be embodied in
the character of the supervisor, or in the routine cal-
culations of a technique such as standard costing, but
would inhere in the process itself.
As mentioned above, Luhmann (1964, p. 98) suggested
that quantification unburdens the management. Miller
and O’Leary confirm this assumption and add that the
burden is internally re-arranged and, in large parts,
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shifted to the workforce. These changes, however, do
not establish a stable structure. Instead, Miller and
O’Leary (1994b) emphasise the instability of the newcon-
figuration of the production process:
A perpetually failing series of programs and instru-
ments for governing economic life. It is this instability,
combinedwith a constant search for temporary stabil-
ities, that in large part explains the process of trying
to create a new reality on the factory floor in a par-
ticular North American factory in the 1980s. (p. 491,
author’s italics)
Instability, and, in response to it, the continual repair
of failures, is seen as a critical part of the success of
Caterpillar’s reform as it established a permanent adap-
tation process. The organisation, staff, and politics were
kept alert at all times.
2.3. Guidelines of Empirical Exploration
Miller and O’Leary’s (1994a, 1994b) layered model of or-
ganisational change provides us with a basic understand-
ing of reform that suggests, first, a distinction between
three levels, i.e., politics, organisation, and individuals.
Reflecting on the interactions of these three levels is ex-
pected to more comprehensively capture the drivers of,
and challenges to, reform. Second, the reorganisation of
theworking procedures draws particular attention to the
receiving side of knock-on effects, i.e., the workers and
their skills to handle quantification and to assume new
responsibilities are considered important although they
are often overlooked in the literature. Third, the instabil-
ity of reform is considered essential for its success, i.e.,
success is based on establishing what we described as a
continual process of repairing the flaws of the previous
reform (see also Luhmann, 1992). These basic elements
of an analytical framework guide the empirical analysis
of the next section.
3. The Case of a German University and Its Reform
This study follows the single-case-scheme outlined
above. Thus, the results of the empirical part are tenta-
tive and exploratory, focusing on the effects of quantifi-
cation at the successful, medium-sized MU in Germany.
The MU lacks a medical department and instead has
developed a strong social science focus. Such deviation
from the ‘normal university’ requires more managerial
effort by the MU-management as the state-programmes
discussed below are designed to steer a comprehensive,
‘normal’ institution. The study is based on policy docu-
ments and interviews. References toMU-documents and
interviews have been anonymised and the cited passages
from the interviews were translated by the author. At
the core of the article, an interview with the team of the
Vice Chancellor’s office, including the Vice Chancellor,
is analysed sequentially (e.g., Herz, Peters, & Truschkat,
2015); it explores what specific solutions to the problem
of quantification and reform can be identified atMU. The
focus on one university clearly suggests that the main re-
sults of this article cannot be ‘representative.’ At best, it
is able to identify critical issues which could inform and
further guide more systematic investigations into the re-
lationship between quantification and organisational re-
form across German universities.
3.1. The Political Side of the University Reform
In the early 1990s, the political debate surrounding
German higher education emphasised the urgency of
university reform. The reform needed to respond to
three principal challenges. First, the need for the regime
to bemore efficient in order to provide reasonably priced
higher education for as many people as possible. Second,
the once internationally leading German university sys-
tem had become a laggard in global competition, fail-
ing to innovate and thus endangering the prosperity of
German society. A third challenge concerned the aca-
demic profession. The professional opacity turned deci-
sion making into a ‘garbage can’ (Cohen, March, & Olsen,
1972), it protected “rotten apples” within the academic
profession and avoided to hold professionals account-
able for the substantial resources used in the higher edu-
cation sector (for the German case see e.g., Schimank,
2005). Political discourse at the time highlighted the
need for change; the NPM-doctrines were expected to
provide the tools necessary to improve the efficiency and
accountability of universities and consequently reshape
the welfare and competitive functions of the higher edu-
cation sector.
However, the German reform discourse takes us a
step further as it converges at the assessment that the
university is unable (and often unwilling) to reform it-
self. Thus, reform has to be driven externally, by the
state (Stichweh, 1994). The traditional state-dependency
of theGermanuniversities (see also Clark, 1986) could be
identified in the interviews. The interviewees addressed
the state and its reform objective right at the beginning
of the conversation and summarised the basic reform
idea: “Achievements should be rewarded, that was the
key motto of the Lander Parliament” (interview).
This ambition to reward achievement suggests the
introduction of differentiation in resource allocation to
benefit those who perform better. The way this differen-
tiation is implemented requires more concrete steps of
operationalisation. One important stepwas shown at the
beginning of one of the interviews, when the interview-
ers briefly introduced the comparative research project.
One interviewee reacted to this methodological remark
by reporting that MU was placed in a setting where all
universities of the land were being compared accord-
ing to performance indicators (see in next paragraph
Leistungsorientierte Mittelverteilung, in short LOM). The
state administration had delineated a comparative en-
vironment in which the reform unfolded. The state de-
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fined the objects of comparison (universities) and the cri-
teria of comparison (indicators), and together they indi-
cate where and how much differentiation is in political
demand (for these critical elements of comparison, see
Heintz, 2016).
The state administration designed the LOM (i.e.,
‘performance-based budgeting’; for more detail, see
Huber & Hillebrandt, 2019) which condenses the state’s
ideas regarding how and where the universities should
compete. The LOM operationalises academic perfor-
mance through publication scores, third party funding,
and ‘status’-indicators. While all of the academic activi-
ties are measured, the interviews emphasised that only
a small part of the state’smonetary allocations is used for
such competitive arrangements. Within the cameralistic
budgeting, LOM is therefore biased and relative. Biased,
as LOMweighs performance uniformly across the sector
and fails to account for differences, for instance, among
the size of universities or disciplinary characteristics. For
example, MU can be expected to have a weaker perfor-
mance in publications and third-party funding as it lacks
a medical department that normally performs well on
these indicators. The university may counteract this bias
by adapting and optimising the measurement methods,
but a bias towards natural and life sciences, as well as
bigger units, affects financial distributions. LOM is rela-
tive as resource allocation is restricted to single accounts
of the cameralistic model, not the overall budget. This
implies that the resource pool does not increase with in-
creased productivity, but (if at all) as the result of polit-
ical decisions. Therefore, redistributions by LOM do not
reflect improvements in productivity, but the relative in-
crease vis-à-vis other universities. In effect, one could
get less money for higher productivity if other universi-
ties had increased their productivity to a greater degree.
As a result, the LOM challenges planning at the organi-
sational level (a repeated complaint throughout the in-
terviews) as it does not address the immediate perform-
ers but affects the university as a whole. Another effect
of this comparative setting is that the university has be-
come the key object of comparison. In the higher educa-
tion studies, this shift has been captured by the univer-
sity “becoming an organisational actor” (e.g., Krücken &
Meier, 2006). Practically, this means that the university
administration is held responsible for the performance
of its staff and the optimal positioning of the university
in the LOM scheme. Control of performance is shifted
towards the university. Besides LOM, the state also in-
stalled other programmes where additional resources
are allocated. The intervieweesmentioned that the state
compensates for: (i) tuition fees; (ii) negotiates perfor-
mances directly with the university management (for ex-
ample, student uptake); (iii) adds overhead resources
to third-party funding; and (iv) allocates resources di-
rectly to chairs or faculties. All these programmes are
initiated by politics (see also Hillebrandt, 2020). They
are fragmented and vary greatly in terms of objectives
and allocative procedures, but their common feature
is the idea of rewarding achievement through differen-
tial allocation.
The state imposes governance by numbers and the
university steers some of these programmes with the
help of their own numbers. For example, tuition fees
were highly contested in Germany, and after 2013 all
Lander administrations retreated from this idea and pro-
vided free higher education again. Given that fees trans-
formed the income structure of universities, the state
substituted the fees, however not as part of the overall
budget, but as an isolated, publicly visible provision to
accentuate students as an income source of universities.
These direct allocations are based on an undifferentiated
headcount but are turned into a performance-driven
regime inside the university. Another state-programme
directly allocates funding based on agreements with in-
stitutes or persons as direct service providers for the
state; here experiments regarding student access issues,
specific educational programmes, or expertise are initi-
ated and supported through additional financial alloca-
tions. These allocations are partially driven by indicators
but depend mainly on the task at hand. To some ex-
tent, they can be connected to quantification, but this
connection is mainly made by the selection of providers.
The next section outlines how the university ‘internalises’
these state-programmes.
3.2. How the MU Adapts the Political Reform
The state plays a critical role in university reformanduses
quantification to operationalise some individual pro-
grammes. Major parts of the implementation of these
programmes, however, are delegated to the university.
This division of labour is recognised by MU and seen as
being a part of the reform process: “Actually, prospective
management is all the Land is providing, it is up to us to
provide the rest. And universities handle it differently” (in-
terview, author’s emphasis).
Thus, the university’s actorhood manifests itself in
MU’s new responsibility for performance and its transla-
tion of these ‘state numbers’ into locally meaningful and
applicable strategies and indicator systems. The remain-
der of this section illustrates some examples of how this
has been done at MU.
The Caterpillar model suggested that work processes
need to be modularised, simplified, and restructured.
But to internalise competition, Caterpillar not only re-
structured the process but also made its elements easy
for the workers to compare through ‘competitor bench-
marking.’ TheMU case suggests a different development
as the main source of change is not the organisation but
the state-LOM and its predefined competitive environ-
ment. The MU mirrored and slightly adapted the LOM
by making subtle changes. First, the university scheme
changed the relative weight of LOM-indicators. Second,
although most indicators are standardised across the
sector—e.g., number of publications, student/teacher
ratios, graduates, and third-party funding—local and po-
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litical indicators such as ‘gender equality’ were added.
Third, algorithms like the averaging the outcome over
three years or installing caps to the possible changes
of resource allocations were applied to ensure a robust,
manageable outcome. The university scheme deviated
from the LOMand the interviews highlighted that the uni-
versity’s foremost interest was not competition, but to
guarantee a manageable allocation of resources. As far
as the production process is concerned, the performance
indicators address the Chair, i.e., the professor and her
(academic and non-academic) collaborators, as the main
production unit. At first sight, this arrangement seems
unspectacular, but it gets more interesting when com-
pared to other allocation strategies.
Student fees provide a different example of organisa-
tional adaptation. As mentioned above, all Lander par-
liaments ceased to demand fees from students after
2013. To substitute these payments, the state compen-
sated a certain amount per student, i.e., it focused on
the receiver of performance, and treated all students
equally. At the university level, the management of stu-
dent fees was translated into a very different idea that
altered the production process and, in the course of the
reform, established a new ‘performance address.’ The
organisational strategy also started with the number of
students but allocated their fees per ‘full-time student
equivalent’ (Vollzeitstudienäquivalent, VSÄ), i.e., an in-
dicator reflecting the relative share that teachers and
teaching groups have in the education of each single
student. Thus, the university shifted the focus onto the
performance of teachers. The VSÄ reflects that students
are not taught by one, but by several teachers, all of
whom should get a fair share of the fee. Thus, the VSÄ
places performance at the (aggregated) level of themod-
ule (and exams), as this is considered the fairest rep-
resentation of teaching performance. Manageability is
now considered to depend on internal fairness, other-
wise ‘system maximisers’ could exploit the system and
generate additionalmanagerial challenges (formore, see
Section 3.3). Thus, MU-teachers connected by the mod-
ules received their ‘payment’ relative to their share of
each module; internally, all teachers linked to a specific
module got an equal share of the fee. From an organ-
isational perspective, membership of such professional
groups became critical. An interviewee remarked on the
previous situation:
We had no legally responsible units in the depart-
ments. Professional groups were informal, nobody
could determinewho really belongs to them. Because,
if somebody would say, I have got nothing to do with
your professional group, I set up my own, nobody
could have objected. (interview)
With the fees, the professional groups became the new
addressees. They were easily rearranged and at least
partially able to overcome the problems of internal re-
distribution in departments which were described as
follows: “We had the experience that individual units,
teaching units, allocate very different burdens….Single
staff members supervised 30–40 diplomas, and one staff
supervised one per term and refused to accept a second
supervision” (interview). Thus, the use of VSÄ helped
to: (i) translate the state programme to the organisa-
tional level; and (ii) to provide a solution to the man-
agement problem of distributive fairness (rather than, as
above, efficiency).
These two cases suggest that political programmes
are adopted and administered by the university one by
one, i.e., the production process ismodified not in a com-
prehensive way, but each political initiative remains iso-
lated also at the university level. Three aspects are par-
ticularly interesting: First, the organisational autonomy is
reinforced by the university’s management of the inher-
ent tensions between the political programmes, their un-
derlying objectives, and their locally feasible implemen-
tation. Second, the university is able to provide more
efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness at the same time,
just not within the same programme. This increase in
differentiation, that was claimed by organisational soci-
ology (e.g., Luhmann, 1964), requires the strengthening
of the organisational core. This effect can also be ob-
servedwhen the university launched its own ‘special sup-
port programme’ that aimed to (moderately) fence off
the effects of political programmes and help staff to ob-
tain funds—for example, by covering travel costs or the
support of publications—which would otherwise slip be-
tween the cracks in other allocative mechanisms. This
‘special support programme’ is a way in which the or-
ganisation can individually manage unwanted but polit-
ically intended effects of the overall allocation regimes
that interfere with the normal operations of the univer-
sity. Third, the university applied these political strate-
gies independent of each other, not because they were
not able to bundle them, but because the political ori-
gin of these programmes required both public visibility
(cf. Luhmann, 1981) and the decoupling of programmes.
This last also enabled the university to respond more
flexibly and to compensate some of the organisation-
ally dysfunctional effects of other programmes. The uni-
versity reform can be best illustrated as a grid, with
three horizontal layers of politics, organisation, and staff,
each re-organised distinctly by the vertical programmes,
mostly initiated by the state (see Table 1). While a uni-
fying strategy had been chosen at Caterpillar, the MU
kept those political strategies loosely coupled, and ‘in-
vented’ a variety of performance addresses: Individuals
and Chairs, professional groups, and organisational sub-
structure, such as institutes or departments, were to
be held responsible for performance. This new flexibil-
ity in allocating responsibilities also enabled new man-
agement options: For example, when modules became
the key addressees for performance, the university was
able to (and in some cases, does) reorganise its study
programmes by rearranging modules without consider-
ing disciplinary structures. The university is able to gen-
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Table 1. Summarising the main features of the MU reform.
Three Levels of Analysis
Political Organisational Setting up responsible
expectations adaptation workers
How MU responds
to political
programmes
Performance Direct demands Facilitator, pure Department, institute,
agreements administration Chair
LOM Reward as principle Optimise Universities Chairs are held responsible
performance
Student funding Substitute student VSÄ as internal allocative Professional groups around
fees mechanism module
Special support — Negotiated balance Individual Researcher
programmes and peace
erate numerous (interdisciplinary) degree courses from
a small number of modules.
3.3. New Professional Roles
Quantification, i.e., the allocative procedures, together
with the adaptations of the production process, de-
mands the individual member to perform flexibly, coop-
erate with changing module partners, and behave en-
trepreneurially (also vis-à-vis the university administra-
tion, e.g., Scholz & Stein, 2010). Our interviewees, how-
ever, did not praise this new flexibility and adaptabil-
ity of the academic profession, but rather emphasised
that individual professors overreacted to numbers, and
gamed them. For example, the interviewees were puz-
zled by the fact that performance indicators had such
a strong steering effect given that they only covered an
insignificant part of the budget. They explained this ef-
fect by the psychological disposition of professors. The
examples they referred to in the course of the interview
ranged from a professor ‘freaking out’ because he ‘lost’
€12, to staff systematically manipulating their perfor-
mance measurements, for example by slicing one exam
into three (thus, tripling their internal LOM score), or us-
ing ISBN for teaching slides and counting themas publica-
tions. These complaints suggest that professors respond-
ing disproportionally to changes in allocation are ‘system
optimisers’ and are consideredmorally deficient. An ‘eco-
nomic’ explanation would point to the fact that even the
smallest differentiation in allocation may establish new
social positions derived from the ‘demonstrative con-
sumption’ that is made possible by these additional re-
sources and reshape professorial behaviour (e.g., Veblen,
2009). This economic explanation can be supported by
organisational studies that perceive the apparent over-
reaction as a reasoned response when repeated deci-
sions of performance-based budgeting stress how criti-
cal those indicators are for their success in the organi-
sation. By these decisions, the academic teachers are—
repeatedly—differentiated as either successful/affluent
members of the profession or less successful/poor ones,
and they learn that even subtle differences highlight
the different levels of appreciation by the organisational
management, and therefore provide strong incentives
for them to change their behaviour (see also Luhmann,
1981, p. 96). Thus, what the university management per-
ceives an overreaction reflects the emergence of new
organisational and political norms. Overreaction is not
a personal deficiency, but rather signals the presence
of tensions regarding the professional understanding of
roles and the organisation. Given that only a small num-
ber of professionals overreacted, it might be concluded
that themajority arewell integrated into the new regime.
A “new academic citizenship” emerged which strongly
responds to organisational signals and the competitive
structures of the regime (see also Scholz & Stein, 2010).
4. Analysis and Concluding Remarks
Although this section must start by cautioning against
generalising our findings as they are based on a single
case, it is also true that the layered model of Miller and
O’Leary proved helpful for structuring and explaining the
performance-oriented reforms at MU, and thus turned
Caterpillar and the MU into comparable cases. With the
university case also showing that organisational reform is
not driven by organisational dynamics alone but is com-
plemented and sometimes contradicted by political pro-
grammes, and the necessary re-socialisation of univer-
sitymembers (see also Schiebel, 2019), the results of this
study seem to have the potential to informmore compre-
hensive future studies in the field of higher education.
A first finding that could guide such studies con-
firms that politics played a critical role for the reforms.
However, the MU case differs from Caterpillar as politics
not only emphasised the urgency of reform but was also
a critical source of change. The state introduced the idea
of ‘rewarding performance’ in the form of performance
indicators to differentiate the allocation of resources.
Due to its restricted volume however, the LOM did not
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fundamentally redirect the university’s financial gover-
nance, rather, it operated on a symbolic level, but was
nevertheless effective. This restricted change indicates
the key challenge to the university management: On
one hand, it takes up new responsibilities and redesigns
the production process; and on the other hand, it per-
petuates the university’s state-dependency and its pro-
fessional traditions (see Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson,
2000). This trade-off has penetrated the very core of
the reform and leaves the university with the herculean
task of ‘changing without change.’ Politics agreed on the
need to act and provided a set of programmes. However,
related changes—for functionality reasons—cannot be
translated directly to the university level but are partially
absorbed by the organisation. The questions that follow
from this observation concern the degree to which po-
litical changes reach the organisational level, if they can
remain purely symbolic or to what extent do they rede-
fine the functionality of the university?
A second finding concerns the organisational re-
sponses to resource differentiation. The performance-
indicator-based strategies were—as the communication
theory of quantification suggested—translated by the
university into local schemes. To meet organisational
needs, the MU modified performance indicators to ‘cor-
rect’ the effects of the LOM that were found to be coun-
terproductive. A comparative view would enlighten us
about the structural limits to such translations. As or-
ganisational sociology predicted, the diverse state pro-
grammes will lead to an internal differentiation of or-
ganisational management. The fact that the state’s pro-
grammes were not bundled at the organisational level
but implemented independently, can partly be explained
by a political logic of visibility, but also by the fact that iso-
lated ways to ‘digest’ the political strategies strengthen
the organisational core and thus the MU’s actorhood.
The political programmes are compartmentalised by the
university, not necessarily to ease or optimise the pro-
duction process, but to reflect on the overall organisa-
tional purpose, management demands, and coordina-
tion problems (cf. Luhmann, 1964, p. 144). A strong
indicator of this reclaimed autonomy of the adminis-
trative core is the special programme that should re-
pair allocative unfairness. At the same time, such com-
partmentalisation provided operational flexibility and al-
lowed the university to navigate the conflict between
goals—e.g., between efficiency and fairness—and as a
result, contributed to the new actorhood of the univer-
sity. But this actorhood develops under conditions of
state-dependency and raises the question of how far
such independence is politically or organisationally fea-
sible. This becomes tangible when contrasting the vari-
ance of political programmes and the organisational re-
sponse with Caterpillar’s uniform approach to simplify
and modularise the production process. Some of the lo-
cal solutions indicate the emergence of a strong bureau-
cracy. Also, the case of substituting student fees points
to the strengthening of managerial functions, and it also
provides the university with the possibility of flexibly
combining modules and thus establishing new courses
and study programmes at low cost. The production pro-
cess may be simplified at the level of the individual pro-
grammes as, overall, the reform generated a confusing
multitude of new addresses and competing procedures.
This variety of new institutional addresses made the re-
form process less stable and, at the same time, allowed
the university management to balance unwanted effects
and reduce the biases implicit in the strategies.
Third, the organisational reform challenges tradi-
tional responsibilities and by that also the traditional
roles of academic professionals. Caterpillar needed to
generate a workforce that was able to read and willing
to be guided by numbers; staff who should ‘own’ the
production process. The higher education literature in-
dicates that professions are already ‘owners’ of the pro-
duction process and that they could (until now) resist
organisational attempts to appropriate teaching and re-
search. This assumption made the observation of the un-
certainties of professorial behaviour even more interest-
ing. The challenges to professional roles have internally
been interpreted as individual and highly irritating strate-
gies; ‘system optimisers’ and their ‘morally deficient be-
haviour’ indicated that new allocation strategies tend to
trigger the optimisation of income rather than of out-
put or professional quality. However, the staff’s deviant
behaviour showed that the new governance rules had
started to have an effect, even if the university manage-
ment apparently would have preferred less adaptation.
The balance between steering effects and professional in-
dependence needs to be reassigned, mainly for the pur-
pose of university management. How this could be done
should be studied in greater detail.
The MU case confirms the importance of quantifica-
tion for university reform, but also raises numerous new
questions that require more comprehensive studies. For
example, the interviewees suggested that the translation
of political programmes varies by university. If the state
programmes were dealt with independently, these spe-
cific local solutions would require further, comparative
attention. Moreover, organisational sociology suggests
that the political expectations would lead to internal dif-
ferentiation and a strengthening of the central adminis-
tration. Does this assumption hold for all political pro-
grammes and organisations equally or do we observe
a more centralised, bundled steering of financial allo-
cations? Furthermore, if the professional role changes,
what would it mean for the profession of academics?
Are professionals able to deal with the various demands
that each translation process brings about or do profes-
sional roles diversify and further specialise? Also, up to
what point can the professional core of the university be
adapted and when does change challenge the function-
ing of the university?
This article placed itself between two positions char-
acteristic of higher education studies. On one hand, a
vast literature has emerged discussing the deficiencies
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of universities which can be healed only by ‘turning the
university into an organisational actor’ (e.g., Krücken &
Meier, 2006), while on the other hand, the particularity
of the university is highlighted (e.g.,Musselin, 2007). This
study emphasised the flexibility of the organisational
form of the university and its ability to make trade-offs
between the necessary adaptation to financial and po-
litical conditions of research and teaching, and its aca-
demic, professional core. Although this seems difficult at
times, the management of and through numbers by the
MU may serve as a reminder of the inevitability of the
universities having to protect professionals against polit-
ical, economic, or public interventions, and of the assur-
ance that it can to a large extent be incorporated into the
traditional organisational form of the university.
Acknowledgments
I gratefully acknowledge funding by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) (Project No. 627097)
under the Open Research Area Scheme (Project Title:
QUAD—Quantification, Administrative Capacity and
Democracy). The article has greatly benefited from the
discussion with workshop participants and the anony-
mous reviewers.
Conflict of Interests
The author declares no conflict of interests.
References
Austin, J. (1975). How to do things with words. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Brunsson, N., & Sahlin-Andersson, K. (2000). Construct-
ing organizations: The example of public sector re-
form. Organization Studies, 21(4), 721–746
Clark, B. (1986). The higher education system: Academic
organization in cross-national perspective. Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press.
Cohen, M., March, J., & Olsen, J. (1972). A garbage can
model of organizational choice. Administrative Sci-
ence Quarterly, 17(1), 1–25.
Espeland, W., & Sauder, M. (2007). Rankings and reac-
tivity: How public measures recreate social worlds.
American Journal of Sociology, 113(1), 1–40.
Espeland, W., & Stevens, M. (2008). The sociology of
quantification. European Journal of Sociology, 49(3),
401–436.
Heintz, B. (2012). Welterzeugung durch Zahlen: Modelle
politischer Differenzierung in internationalen Statis-
tiken, 1948–2010 [Generating the world through
numbers: Models of political differentiation in in-
ternational statistics, 1948–2010]. Soziale Systeme,
18(1/2), 7–39.
Heintz, B. (2016). „Wir leben im Zeitalter der Vergle-
ichung.” Perspektiven einer Soziologie des Vergleichs
[“We live in an era of comparison.” Perspectives of
a sociology of comparison]. Zeitschrift für Soziologie,
45(5), 305–323.
Heintz, B. (2018). Von der Allmacht der Zahlen und
der Allgegenwart des Bewertens [About the omnipo-
tence of numbers and the omnipresence of assess-
ments]. Soziologische Revue, 41(4), 629–642.
Herz, A., Peters, L., & Truschkat, I. (2015). How to do qual-
itative structural analysis: The qualitative interpreta-
tion of network maps and narrative interviews. Fo-
rum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative
Social Research, 16(1). http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/
fqs-16.1.2092
Hillebrandt, M. (2020). Keeping one’s shiny Mercedes
in the garage: Why higher education quantification
never really took off in Germany. Politics and Gover-
nance, 8(2), 48–57.
Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons?
Public Administration, 69(1), 3–19.
Huber, M., & Hillebrandt, M. (2019). “Pay for promise” in
higher education: The influence of NPM on resource
allocation in German universities.Historical Social Re-
search, 44(2), 247–269.
Krücken, G., & Meier, F. (2006). Turning the university
into an organizational actor. In G. S. Drori, J. W.
Meyer, & H. Hwang (Eds.), Globalization and organi-
zation: World society and organizational change (pp.
241–257). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Krüger, A. K. (2020). Quantification 2.0? Bibliometric
infrastructures in academic evaluation. Politics and
Governance, 8(2), 58–67.
Luhmann, N. (1964). Funktionen und Folgen formaler Or-
ganisation [Functions and consequences of formal
organisations]. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Luhmann, N. (1981). Politische Theorie im Wohlfahrts-
staat [Political theory in the welfare state]. Munich:
Günter Olzog Verlag.
Luhmann, N. (1992). Zwei Quellen der Bürokratisierung
in Hochschulen [Two sources of bureaucratization in
universities]. In A. Kieserling (Ed.), Universität als Mi-
lieu [University as ambience] (pp. 74–79). Bielefeld:
Haux.
Luhmann, N. (1997). Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft
[The society of society]. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Mennicken, A., & Espeland, W. (2019). What’s new
with numbers? Sociological approaches to the study
of quantification. Annual Review of Sociology, 45,
223–245.
Miller, P. (2001). Governing by numbers: Why calculative
practices matter. Social Research, 68(2), 379–396.
Miller, P. (2007). Wie und warum das Rechnungswesen
in der Soziologie in Vergessenheit geriet [How and
why sociology forgot accounting]. In A. Mennicken &
H. Vollmer (Eds.), Zahlenwerk: Kalkulation, Organisa-
tion und Gesellschaft [Creating numbers: Calculation,
organization and society] (pp. 19–42).Wiesbaden: VS
Verlag.
Miller, P., & O’Leary, T. (1994a). Accounting, “economic
citizenship” and the spatial reordering of manufac-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 26–35 34
ture. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 19(1),
15–43.
Miller, P., & O’Leary, T. (1994b). The factory as laboratory.
Science in Context, 7(3), 469–496.
Musselin, C. (2007). Are universities specific organiza-
tions? In G. Krücken, A. Kosmützky, &M. Torka (Eds.),
Towards a multiversity? Universities between global
trends and national traditions (pp. 63–86). Bielefeld:
Transcript.
Porter, T. (1996). Trust in numbers: The pursuit of objec-
tivity in science and public life. Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press.
Power, M. (2007). Organized uncertainty: Designing a
world of risk management. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Ringel, L., Brankovic, J., & Werron, T. (2020). The orga-
nizational engine of rankings: Connecting “new” and
“old” institutionalism. Politics and Governance, 8(2),
36–47.
Rose, N. (1991). Governing by numbers: Figuring out
democracy. Accounting, Organizations and Society,
16(7), 673–692.
Schiebel, F. (2019). Entscheidungsprobleme in Univer-
sitäten [Decision problems at Universities] (Unpub-
lished Masters dissertation). Bielefeld University,
Bielefeld, Germany.
Schimank, U. (2005). ‘New public management’ and the
academic profession: Reflections on the German sit-
uation.Minerva, 43(4), 361–376.
Scholz, C., & Stein, V. (2010). Bilder vonUniversitäten—Ein
transaktionsanalytisch-agenturtheoretischer Ansatz
[Images of universities—A transaction-cost analytical,
agency theoretical approach]. Betriebswirtschaftliche
Forschung und Praxis, 62(2), 129–149.
Stichweh, R. (1994). Die Form der Universität [The form
of the university]. In R. Stichweh (Ed.),Wissenschaft,
Universität, Professionen [Science, university, profes-
sions] (pp. 246–277). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Veblen, T. (2009). The theory of leisure class. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society: An outline of in-
terpretive sociology. Berkeley, CA: University of Cali-
fornia Press.
Wittrock, B. (1993). The modern university: The three
transformations. In S. Rothblatt & B. Wittrock (Eds.),
The European and American university since 1800:
Historical and sociological essays (pp. 303–362).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
About the Author
Michael Huber is Professor of Sociology at the Department of Sociology at Bielefeld University. His
research is focused on organisational sociology, higher education studies, and regulatory policymaking,
more specifically, risk-based regulation.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 26–35 35
